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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RALPH HADLEY, a Minor 
By REX HADLEY, his guardian Ad 
Litem, 
PaintiJff and Appellamt, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS J. WOOD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No. 9007 
The Appellant's Statement of Facts is not complete, 
and we therefore prefer to incorporate our own sum-
mary. 
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This law suit arose out of an accident between the 
defendant's automobile and a sle]gh being ridden by 
the plaintiff minor, which occurred on Sunday after-
noon, January 9, 1955, on Polk avenue in Ogden, Utah, 
about 3 o'clock PM. 
On the day of the accident, the street was snow 
packed, and icy (T-11, 22, 35) the weather was cold (T-
11, 18). 
Polk Avenue runs North and South and is about 
35 feet wide ('T-9, 19). On the day of the accident there 
were snow banks on both sides of the street approxi-
mately three feet high (T-13, 71) which narrowed the 
travel portion of the road to about 25 feet (T-11, 19). 
Polk Avenue, at the scene, is level (T-18) and straight 
(T-17). Residences are located on the West side of the 
street aiJ.d located to the east of Polk avenue is the 
Wasatch School on the top of a rise, which starts just 
east of the sidewalk (T-9, 10). From the base of the rise 
to the east edge of the street, the ground is level (T-20, 
21). The width of the level area was estimated at about 
20 to 25 feet (T-175). On the day of the accident there-
fore, the top of the snow bank was about 3 feet above 
the level area east of the east curb. and the investigating 
officer confirmed the defendant's testimony that the 
bank would block a motorist's vision of a child lying 
on a sleigh in the flat area east of the street (T-22). , 
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There was no traffic as the defendant drove his car 
south on Polk A venue. His speed was ten to twelve miles 
per hour (T-169, 15, 25). As the defendant entered the 
block where the school is located, he saw two or three 
children standing on the hill ( T -181) and about mid 
way up the hill. When he saw the children, none of them 
were sleigh riding (T-192). The defendant could not 
say, and there was no evidence, that plaintiff, Ralph 
Hadley, was one of those children. Defendant first saw 
the plaintiff lying prone on the sleigh as it emerged 
through a slight cut out in the east snow bank, (TR 20, 
197) going west "pretty fast," directly into the path of 
the south bound car (T-170, 184). At that time, the 
distance that separated the sleigh and the car was 10 
to 15 feet (T-184, 15). The defendant immediately 
swerved his car into the west snow bank where the car 
stopped with the front end in the bank "a couple of 
feet" (T-174). The rear wheels were still on the icy 
travel portion of the road (Diagran1). The point where 
young Hadley's sleigh had entered the street was the 
only point where the children had "cut through" the 
snow bank (TR 20). 
The def.endant felt no impact with the sleigh (T-171) 
and felt that the accident had been averted. However, 
when he got out of his car, he found the boy under 
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the ear, pinned between the transmission housing and 
the snow bank ( T -173). The sleigh was not dmnaged 
(T-127). 
The unanimous verdict of the jury was in favor of 
the defendant, no cause for action (T-209). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Respondent respectfully submits two points: 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 




THE VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It is clear that the question of the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff minor is not an issue· in this 
case. Appellant's reference to that subject, in the open-
ing paragraph of his Statement of Facts, and in Point 
1 of his Argument, is particularly curious, in light with 
the fact that defendant's requested instruction Number 
11, on the child's contributory negligence, was denied 
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by the Court, and the jury was instructed 1n very 
definite language, as follows: 
No. 14. 
Even if it should appear to you from the 
evidence in this case that the parents of plaintiff 
were negligent in the manner in which they exer-
cised, or failed to exercise, their parental duties 
for his care, . such negligence, if any, may not be 
imputed to the plaintiff and shall not constitute 
a bar to recovery by him, if otherwise he is en-
titled to recover. 
Likewise the negligence, if any, of any child 
dealing with the plaintiff would not be a defense 
if the defendant is otherwise liable. 
In some cases you rnay have heard of the 
defense of "contributory negligence," "contribu-
tory negligence'' as a defense is based on public 
policy that does not permit the Courts to be used 
by one wrong doer to recover from another, and 
that is not for the public good that one guilty 
himself to sue another; such a public policy en-
courages careful conduct by all. 
This policy has no application in case where 
a child about six years and one month old brings 
a suit under circumstances as presented in this 
case. The law conclusively concludes that the 
child is incapable of the judgn1ent and attentive-
ness necessary to bring his own misconduct to the 
magnitude that would justify an adult otherwise 
liable in successfully asserting contributory neg-
ligence as a defense. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'6 
It must be remembered however that regard-
less of the tender years of a child, no person is 
liable to a child unless the adult has been negli-
gent as the term is here defined, and that 
negligence was approximate cause of the child's 
injury. 
Plaintiff's contentions here, therefore, are limited 
to one proposition, and that is the contention that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, 
which proximately caused the accident and injuries to 
the plaintiff minor. 
Plaintiff made no motion at the close of all the 
evidence, that a verdict be directed in his favor. The 
defendant made a Motion for a dismissal of the action, 
at the close of the Plaintiff's case, and later, a directed 
verdict at the close of all the evidence, both of which 
were denied. 
The Honorable Court at T-156, stated: 
"I believe there are questions of fact raised 
because of those two matters that can be sub-
mitted to the jury. That is, the first upon the 
testimony of driving too fast under the circum-
stances, circumstances of the nature coming from 
the Major's (Riblett) testimony and the circum-
stances, and also, circumstantial evidence as to 
failure to keep proper lookout." 
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The testin1ony of Major Riblett, plaintiff's witness, 
and ·"the circumstantial evidence" concerning defend-
ant's lookout were indeed shaky foundations upon which 
plaintiff's case rested. We gladly look at the evidence, 
but not as digested in Appellant's Brief. 
"Plaintiff's brief relates facts which most 
strongly support their own contentions. However, 
on appeal, we must take the opposite approach 
and consider those facts that most strongly sup-
port the verdict, where there is evidence pointing 
in different directions" Morley vs Rodberg, 7 
Utah 2nd, 299, 323 Pac. 2nd, 717. 
As indicated by the trial Judge, the only possible 
evidence concerning a speed of defendant's car at more 
than 10 to 12 miles per hour, was given by Major Rib-
lett. But his testimony, digested, was: 
1. He did not see the accident and did not see the 
defendant's car as it traveled the entire length of the 
block to the point of ilnpact ( T -40). 
2. He had seen a car pass hiln on 32nd street, 
going west, at a speed he estilnated at 25 miles per 
hour (T-38), and saw that car turn left on to Polk 
A venue. (Defendant testified he had previously ap-
proaehed Polk Avenue, going East and had turned right 
on to Polk Avenue (TR 168).) 
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3. The witness followed the car ahead, at about 
75 to 100 yards until it followed a curve and went out 
of sight. The witness described the car as a light tan 
or dirty yellow colored, two door ( T -51). 
(Defendant's car was a green convertible, with a 
black top, rather faded) (T-168, 200). 
4. He lost sight of the car only "momentarily" 
(T-51) and when he came in view of the street, he saw 
the defendant's car one half block away, nosed into the 
snow bank at a 45 degree angle. When the witness 
stopped, the defendant was under the car attempting 
to help the boy (T-39, 52, 56). He had not seen l\1r. Wood 
either go to or return from a nearby house (T-56). 
(The defendant, immediately after the accident, ran 
to a house, knocked on the door, told the people to call 
an ambulance, and returned to the car and crawled 
under to help the boy (T-172). This was verified by 
plaintiff's witnesses Sessions (T-69) and Mrs. Sessions 
(T-76, 77) and obviously consumed more time than 
"momentarily," and yet the Major testified at (TR 56): 
"It was a mystery to me how he got under 
that car so fast." 
The jury was justified in concluding that the wit-
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ness was the victim of faulty association of the car he 
followed and the defendant's car, which could not have 
been the same vehicle at all. 
The physical facts, further, clearly disproved the 
Major's testimony concerning the alleged speed of 25 
miles per hour. 
Plaintiff's witness, Officer Rose, testified: 
Tr-12. 
"The snow bank where the car went through 
was fairly soft." 
Tr-22. 
Q. "So that it would not have had too great 
a slowing action upon an automobile plowing 
through it1 
A. "Not too great, no. 
Tr-25. 
Q. "Now in your investigation, did you find 
anything to disprove Mr. Wood's statement to 
you that he was travelling about 10 to 12 miles 
per hour~ 
A. "No, I didn't. 
Tr-22. 
Q. Now how far did you detern1ine that the 
car had travelled after iinpact with this boy~ 
A. I could not determine just exactly where 
the impact was with the boy. I couldn't tell you 
how far it travelled. 
Q. Now isn't it correct that on your report 
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you put three feet~ 
A. That would be the distance it would be 
able to travel after i1npact, was the statement I 
received from the driver. Approximately that. 
That is what it was. 
Q. Now did you measure the distance from 
a line directly across ... from where the children 
had apparently been sleighing, from that imagi-
nary line down to the point where the car had 
stopped~ 
A. No, I did not measure that. 
Q. But it wasn't very far, was it~ 
A. No. 
Plaintiff's own expert, Professor Karl Koerner of 
the Mechanical Engineering Department of the U niver-
sity of Utah, testified that a car, under icy road con-
ditions, at 20 miles per hour would require 180 feet 
to stop, including reaction time of llh seconds ( Tr 107). 
Presumably 60 feet of that distance would be travelled 
during the reaction time, or a total sliding distance of 
120 feet. There was not one iota of evidence to contra-
dict the defendant's testimony that immediately upon 
seeing the child, about 15 feet distant, he swerved into 
the snow bank, and applied his brakes, and yet the rear 
of the car did not whip around; the car stopped only 
partly into the soft snow bank, with the rear wheels 
still on the icy surface; and the car stopped from three 
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feet to "less than a car length" south of the point where 
the sleigh had entered the street, facts which wuold b~; 
physically impossible had the car been travelling 20 to 
25 miles per hour. 
Test, then, the defendant's testimony with the physi-
cal facts. This Honorable Court has repeatedly used a 
reaction time of three-fourths of a second, in testing 
testimony, the most recent case, we believe to be 
Richards vs Anderson, Case No. 8970. Plaintiff's own 
expert believes that to be unrealistic. 
Tr-112. 
"I believe that (tests) seem to bear out ... 
in those ideal conditions, the reaction time is 
roughly three-quarters of a second. However, I 
think the formula is a little bit more complicated 
than that and most designers are using two and 
a half to three seconds reaction time for new 
highway work and it is based on the fact that 
there is personality involved, the time of the day 
when you go to work, your people's feelings, and 
the fact that there is no warning in a case of an 
automobile situation and a person has to evaluate 
the ·complexity and then make his decision, so 
this jumps the reaction time up a little bit and 
I thought that one and a half is more realistic 
really than three-quarters." 
But the Professor does agree that a "simple" re-
action of swerving might well be accomplished in three-
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fourth's second, while the "complex'' reaction of remov-
ing the foot from the accelerator to the brake would take 
materially longer. (Tr-115-116) 
Using the three fourths second test, at 10 to 12 miles 
per hour, the distance would be 11 to 13 feet travelled 
before the swerve started, and according to the officer, 
as well as the defendant, the car stopped immediately, 
the stopping being caused obviously by the snow bank 
rather than the braking of the car. 
The Honorable Trial Court submitted the question 
of the defendant's lookout to the jury. Hindsight, of 
course, is a wonderful thing, but we must bear in mind 
that as the defendant drove into view .of the Wasatch 
School, which was not a designated sleigh riding area, 
there was not one child slevgh riding down the school 
ground slope, or anywhere else tin the block. The de-
fendant proceeded at a speed of 10 to 12 miles per hour, 
a speed which would be safe and cautious, even if we 
saddled the defendant with knowledge that the children 
had previously been sleighing. There was a three foot 
high snow bank between the hill and the road, against 
which many of the children previously had stopped, 
without entering the street. There were no sleigh tracks 
across the street for a motorist to see and be forewarned. 
(T-21, Officer Rose) The one spot in the block long snow 
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bank through which the plaintiff minor and his friend 
Steven Branz, had gone partly over and partly through 
the bank (Tr-20) certainly would not be observed and 
appreciated by the normal driver as a red flag of danger. 
Indeed, it is doubtful that at a distance, it would be 
apparent that there was any "cut" in the bank at all. 
The plaintiff minor did not testify, although he was 
In Court. Steven, Branz, age 12, and therefore, age 8 
years at the time of the accident, was the only ·witness 
produced by the plaintiff who claimed to be an eye wit-
ness. He testified, (Tr-130) 
Tr132 
". . . and when we were coming up, I was 
ahead of Ralph and we were just about to the top 
and he started down and I shouted to him and he 
kept going and the car tried to stop and it skidded 
and they both met, more or less, as it hit the snow 
bank." 
Q. Steven, where were you standing when you 
yelled at Ralph~ 
A. About the top of the hill. 
Q. About the top of the hill and Ralph was al-
ready going do"\vn the hill~ 
A. Yes. 
The Honorable Trial Court, on the above vague 
evidence, ruled that there was a question for the jury 
as to whether the defendant was negligent for not seeing 
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the boy on the sleigh (before the sleigh entered the area 
of no visibility below the snow bank), and of course 
whether his failure to see the boy was a proximate cause 
of the accident. With that decision we need not now 
quarrel. But it is crystal clear, that at best, it was a jury 
question, upon which the jury has rendered its verdict. 
This Court, in Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., 239 Pac. 2nd, 163 stated: 
"A good statement of the proper approach 
is made by the Supreme Court of Idaho in Adkins 
v. Zalasky, 59 Idaho 292, 81 Pac. 2nd, 1090, 1093, 
wherein it was stated: 'One reason for the rule 
that the existence of negligence, or contributory 
negligence, is not generally a question for th~ 
judge is that a jury is composed of members of 
various ages, occupations and experiences, and 
is in a better position to determine what a reason-
ably prudent person would do, under stated cir-
cumstances, than is a trial judge or an appellate 
court. . . . It is only when there can be but one 
possible answer, reasonably made, to that ques-
tion, that a trial judge, or an appellate Court 
should assume to decide it." 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE 
NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiff has, in Point II of his Brief, complained of 
three Instructions taken verbatim from Jury Instruction 
Forms, Utah. Instruction No. 10 is found at 16.10, 
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J.I.F.U. under the title "General Rules in Negligence 
Actions." 
Instruction No. 11, combined 15.6 and 15.7, J.I.F.U. 
and Instruction No. 13 incorporates 15.8, J.I.F.U., the 
latter three approved instructions being listed under 
the title "Basic Negligence Concepts Defined." 
Obviously, the Trial Court gave the jury the above 
instructions as a foundation for their deliberations. We 
believe that the appellant cannot properly complain be-
cause the Court defined proximate cause; or explained 
the obvious proposition that no one is under the legal 
duty to anticipate an emergency until he observes, or 
should observe,. something to warn him. 
Instructions numbers 11 and 13, contrary to appel-
lant's argument, were actually favorable to the plaintiff. 
~here was sufficient evidence before the jury from which 
they could have found that the mother of the minor was 
negligent, and while this was not a defense set up, the 
Court in instruction nuniber 13, and 14 clearly advised 
the :jury that if they found the defendant negligent, and 
his negligence a proximate cause of the accident, the 
plaintiff minor must recover, even if they found his 
rp.other, another child, or the plaintiff hin1self also negli-
gent. 
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It goes without saying that the Instructions attacked 
by the plaintiff have nothing to do, and say nothing, 
about the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 
We feel that the Instructions as a whole were pro-
plaintiff, and overemphasized plaintiff's case. Perman-
ent disability and loss of future earnings were submitted 
to the jury (number 22) despite the medical testimony 
that any such loss was a result of a bicycle accident many 
months after the automobile accident. Number 27 ad-
vised the jury they could disagree if they could not agree 
on the "Matter of damages." The child's contributory 
negligence was taken from the jury as a question of fact. 
In number 2, the jury was advised in effect, that they 
might find the defendant negligent for not sounding his 
horn. And in Number 24, the Court advised the jury 
that ... "should your determination be that there should 
be no damage, then you will entirely disregard the in-
structions given you upon the matter of damages." 
We believe it obvious that the Instructions, from the 
plaintiff's standpoint, were exceptionally fair, and that 
his contention that they must have been taken to mean 
something other than what their clear language ex-
pressed, is not a proper reason for attack against them. 
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SUMMARY 
Plaintiff now contends that the defendant, as a mat-
ter of law, was negligent and that his negligence was a 
proximate cause of the accident. He made no such con-
tention during the trial, as no Motion for a directed ver-
dict was made by him. 
W eJ feel that plaintiff's evidence proved nothing 
more than that a very unfortunate accident occurred. 
The plaintiff's own witnesses corroborated the defend-
ant's testimony that here was a classic ex~ple of an 
unavoidable accident on defendant's part. 
The jury has decided the issues of fact, and we feel 
Appellant has failed to show any reason why plaintiff 
is entitled to subject defendant to the expense and annoy-
ance of a new trial. 
Plaintiff received an eminently fair trial. Over de-
fendant's objections, the jury was pennitted to view the 
scene four years after the accident, and on a day when no 
snow was on the ground, and where no proper foundation 
was laid showing the lack of changes in the area (Tr-155 
to 165). Over defendant's objections, plaintiff's witnesses 
were permitted to give their opinions of the safe speed 
a nwtorist should travel on the street ( Tr-13, to 14 and 
Tr. 44-45). 
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We respectfully submit that the verdict and Judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS E. MIDGLEY, 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
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